A probabilistic model checking approach to analysing reliability, availability, and maintainability of a single satellite system by Peng, Z. et al.
n 
 
 
 
 
 
Peng, Z., Lu, Y., Miller, A., Johnson, C., and Zhao, T. (2013) A 
probabilistic model checking approach to analysing reliability, availability, 
and maintainability of a single satellite system. In: 7th European 
Symposium on Computer Modelling and Simulation (EMS2013), 20-22 
Nov 2013, Manchester, UK. 
 
Copyright © 2013 IEEE 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
Content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format 
or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s) 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/89809/ 
 
 
 
  Deposited on:  16 January 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
A Probabilistic Model Checking Approach to Analysing Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability of a Single Satellite System
Zhaoguang Peng1,2, Yu Lu2,∗, Alice Miller2, Chris Johnson2 and Tingdi Zhao1
1 School of Reliability and Systems Engineering, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing, China
2 School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom
Abstract—Satellites now form a core component for space
based systems such as GPS and GLONAS which provide
location and timing information for a variety of uses. Such
satellites are designed to operate in-orbit and have lifetimes of
10 years or more. Reliability, availability and maintainability
(RAM) analysis of these systems has been indispensable in
the design phase of satellites in order to achieve minimum
failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF)
and thus to plan maintainability strategies, optimise reliability
and maximise availability. In this paper, we present formal
modelling of a single satellite and logical speciﬁcation of
its reliability, availability and maintainability properties. The
probabilistic model checker PRISM has been used to perform
automated quantitative analyses of these properties.
Keywords-satellite systems; reliability, availability and main-
tainability (RAM) analysis; probabilistic model checking; con-
tinuous time Markov chains (CTMCs)
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of efﬁcient, high-performance, and
low cost satellites, earth orbiting satellites are often deployed
in satellite constellations and space systems to ensure re-
liable and dependable missions. These kinds of satellites
have played an essential part in both civil and military
contexts, and support a wide range of applications rang-
ing from satellite navigation to space stations. Reliability,
availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis has been
indispensable in the design phase of satellites in order to
achieve minimum failures or to increase mean time between
failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintainability strategies,
optimise reliability and maximise availability. The question
of how to select optimal conﬁgurations and maintenance
plans and underlying resources, to satisfy requirements and
improve efﬁciency is a key research question.
This concern calls for effective solutions to the challenges
of verifying large and complex satellite systems. Formal
veriﬁcation is a well-established technique in Computer
Science for either detecting errors, or for providing increased
conﬁdence in the reliability of a system. Until now, attempts
to verifying satellite systems has been piecemeal. Veriﬁca-
tion largely depends on more brute force approaches, such as
simulation and testing. Generally, simulation is the common
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validation approach used for veriﬁcation of such systems and
protocols applied in them. However, simulation has been
unable to keep apace with the growth in satellite design
complexity. It is therefore timely to apply formal veriﬁcation
techniques to this domain.
Model checking is a formal veriﬁcation technique that
involves deﬁning a model of a system from a formal speci-
ﬁcation. The model is then used to check desired properties
of the system. This involves exploring the underlying state
space of the model, and specifying properties via some
formal logic such as temporal logic. In this context, the
effects of proposed changes to an in-orbit system can be ﬁrst
checked via a model, rather than via expensive prototypes.
The required reliability, availability, and maintainability
properties of satellite systems can be expressed in temporal
logic, and so lend themselves very well to proof via model
checking.
The goal of the paper is to adopt probabilistic model
checking to cope with the veriﬁcation demand introduced by
satellite systems. Probabilistic model checking is a formal
method for specifying quantitative properties of a system
model. Models obtained by this technique are normally ex-
tensions or variants of Markov chains or automata, extended
with costs and rewards that estimate resources and their
usage during operation. Properties to be veriﬁed or analysed
are speciﬁed in temporal logic with auxiliary operators
such as probability and reward. We present an automated
quantitative analysis of singe satellite availability with the
probabilistic model checker PRISM [1].
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section II we give
technical background on probabilistic model checking, while
in Section III we present our formal speciﬁcation of a single
satellite and its associated continuous-time Markov chain
(CTMC) model. Then, we perform RAM analysis using
PRISM in Section IV. In Section V we report related work.
Finally, in Section VI we conclude and outline directions for
future research.
II. PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKING
In this section we introduce some formal notations that
are relevant to probabilistic model checking. Note that our
deﬁnitions are from [2], from which further details can be
found.
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Figure 1. A failure model and maintainability plan of a single satellite
A. Continuous-time Markov Chains
Let AP be a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set of atomic propositions.
Formally, a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) C is a
tuple (S,sinit,R,L) where:
• S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} is a ﬁnite set of states.
• sinit ∈ S is the initial state.
• R : S × S → R≥0 is the transition rate matrix.
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function which assigns to
each state si ∈ S the set L(si) of atomic propositions
a ∈ AP that are valid in si.
Intuitively, R(si, sj) > 0 if and only if there is a transition
from state si to state sj . Furthermore, R(si, sj) speciﬁes
that the probability of moving from si to sj within t time
units is 1−e−R(si,sj)·t, an exponential distribution with rate
R(si, sj). If R(si, sj) > 0 for more than one state sj , a
competition between the transitions originating in si exists,
known as the race condition.
B. Continuous Stochastic Logic
Let C = (S, sinit, R, L) be a continuous time Markov
chain. In this section, we introduce Continuous Stochastic
Logic (CSL) [3], [4]. CSL is inspired by the logic Compu-
tation Tree Logic (CTL) [5], and its extensions to discrete
time stochastic systems (PCTL) [6], and continuous time
non-stochastic systems (TCTL) [7]. There are two types of
formulae in CSL: state formulae, which are true or false in
a speciﬁc state, and path formulae, which are true or false
along a speciﬁc path.
Let a ∈ AP be an atomic proposition, p ∈ [0, 1] be a
real number,  ∈ {≤, <,>,≥} be a comparison operator,
and I ⊆ R≥0 be a non-empty interval. The syntax of CSL
formulas over the set of atomic propositions AP is deﬁned
inductively as follows:
• true is a state-formula.
• Each a ∈ AP is a state formula.
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then so are ¬Φ and
Φ ∧Ψ.
• If Φ is state formula, then so is Sp(Φ).
• If ϕ is a path formula, then Pp(ϕ).
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then XIΦ and UIΨ are
path formulas.
Sp(Φ) asserts that the steady-state probability for a Φ
state meets the boundary condition  p. Pp(ϕ) asserts that
the probability measure of the paths satisfying ϕ meets the
bound given by  p. The path formula XIΦ asserts that a
transition is made to a Φ state at some time point t ∈ I .
Operator UI is the timed variant of the until operator of
CTL; the path formula ΦUIΨ asserts that Ψ is satisﬁed at
some time instant in the interval I and that at all preceding
time instants Φ holds.
III. FORMAL MODELLING WITH A CTMC
PRISM [1] is a probabilistic model checker. It sup-
ports the analysis of several types of probabilistic mod-
els: discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-
time Markov chains (CTMCs), Markov decision processes
(MDPs), probabilistic automata (PAs), and also probabilistic
timed automata (PTAs), with optional extensions of costs
and rewards. PRISM allows us to verify properties speciﬁed
in the temporal logics PCTL for DTMCs and MDPs and
CSL for CTMCs. Models are described using the PRISM
language, a simple, state-based language. The abstract model
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of a single satellite is illustrated in Figure 1, parameters are
omitted. We take a CTMC as our underlying PRISM model
for our abstract model. The detailed PRISM model of the
satellite system, the property speciﬁcation and the analysis
results are available in [8].
We specify our actual CTMC model with states, a tran-
sition rate matrix, and a labelling function. Initially, the
satellite runs in the normal state. After a period of execution
it could be interrupted by an scheduled or unscheduled
interruption during its lifecycle. Scheduled interruptions are
normally caused by certain types of Operations and Main-
tenance (O&M) for routine satellite. This can cause satellite
signal unavailability due to the station keeps manoeuvres,
atomic clock maintenance, software updates, and hardware
maintenance. Unscheduled interruptions can be caused by
solar radiation, the earth’s magnetic ﬁeld cosmic rays, which
result in a satellite Single Event Upset (SEU). However, both
scheduled and unscheduled interruptions are usually tempo-
rary, lasting just several hours. An unscheduled interruption
usually disappears automatically. The satellite can fail any
time during its lifetime due to End-of-Life (EOL) outage or
other vital failures.
When the satellite fails, staff on the ground must decide
upon the best approach to repair it. It may be possible that
failures can be resolved on orbit by giving speciﬁc software
commands to the satellite. Otherwise it might be necessary
to move a redundant satellite into position to replace the
failed satellite. If no redundant satellite is available then a
new satellite must be manufactured and launched. In the
worst case, the new satellite does not launch successfully,
due to a known probability of satellite launch failure.
In our paper, parameter values correspond to those latest
U.S. GPS system, GPS Block III satellites. The GPS III
series is the newest block of GPS satellites (SVN-74 and
up). GPS III provides more powerful signals than previous
versions in addition to enhanced signal reliability, accuracy,
and integrity. The key improvement is the 15-year design
lifespan [9]. Since not all of the actual data for the GPS III is
available, in this paper we instead use some parameter values
associated with similar satellite systems. All parameters used
in our CTMC model and properties are speciﬁed in Table I.
Table I
PARAMETERS FOR THE CTMC MODEL AND ANALYSES
R MTBF MTTR tα pβ tγ tδ t pη tκ
0.80 15y 24h 4320h 80% 24h 1440h 4320h 90% 24h
We use p to express probability and t for time, and the
reliability of the satellite is R. If the satellite fails, we say
that it moves from a “normal” state to a “failure” state. Both
the mean time to unscheduled interruption and the mean
time to the scheduled interruption are tα. When the satellite
fails, the probability of the failure being resolved in-orbit by
moving a redundant satellite to replace the failed one is pβ .
If on orbit repair is not possible, a new satellite is needed.
The times taken to decide to build a new satellite and for
one to be manufactured are tγ and tδ respectively. If a new
satellite is to be manufactured, the probability of successful
launch is pη . After successful launch, the time taken for the
satellite to move to the right position and a normal signal
sent from it to be received on ground is tκ.
IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE PRISM
We have identiﬁed the need to analyse reliability, avail-
ability, and maintainability properties of satellite based ap-
plications. We illustrate the use of probabilistic model check-
ing in this domain by describing our PRISM model. The
reliability for a satellite consists of scheduled interruptions,
unscheduled interruptions, and failure states in the system.
The probability of successful launch is the reliability for
the satellite. “Repaired in-orbit”is the maintainability for
the satellite. Reliability and maintainability are availability
properties of a satellite. Reliability must be sufﬁcient to sup-
port the mission capability needed in its expected operating
environment.
If reliability and maintainability are not adequately de-
signed into satellite and space based systems, there is risk
that design will breach desired availability or performance
requirements. System performance baseline thresholds with
signiﬁcantly higher design or development costs due to
resulting corrective action costs; will cost more than antici-
pated to use and operate; or will fail to provide availability
expected by the researchers or users.
Satellite will deteriorate with time due to failure mech-
anisms. We assume that time delay is a random variable
selected from an exponential distribution, which is an as-
sumption used in PRISM. According to the system reliability
theory [10], the reliability of a satellite from R(t) can be
deﬁned as
R(t) = Pr{T > t} = e−λt, (1)
and, then we can obtain
λ(t) =
−lnR(t)
E(si)
. (2)
Satellite failures typically occur at some constant failure
rate λ, failure probability depends on the rate λ and the
exposure time t. Typically failure rates are carefully derived
from substantiated historical data such as mean time between
failure (MTBF ). We have
λ =
−lnR
T
=⇒ λ = −lnR
MTBF
, (3)
where t = T = MTBF , where MTBF is the design
parameter or the statistics parameter. Referring to the lat-
est characteristics of satellites used for Global Positioning
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(a) Reliability property 2 (b) Reliability property 4
Figure 2. Analysis results of reliability properties.
Systems (GPSs), we assume the MTBF of the satellite to
be 15 years. As a result, R = 0.80 and MTBF = 15 years.
Further, the mean time to repair (MTTR) is 24 hours.
PRISM provides support for automated analysis of a wide
range of quantitative properties of these models, such as
“what is the probability of a failure causing the satellite to
stop working within 12 hours?”, “what is the worst-case
probability of the satellite on-board system terminating due
to an error, over all possible initial conﬁgurations?”, or “what
is the worst-case expected time taken for the satellite signal
to be received?”.
A. Reliability Properties and Analysis
Reliability properties that we can analyse using PRISM
include:
1) the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced by a
new one in 15 years at the reliability 0.80:
P=?[F <= T s = 5]; T = 129600;
2) the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced by a
new one due to complete failure in 15 years at the reliability
0.80 over the time:
P=?[F <= Ts = 5];R = 0.80;T = 0 : 129600 : 8640;
3) how many times a satellite will need to be replaced by a
new one in 15 years at the reliability 0.80:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; R = 0.80;
4) how many times a satellite will need to be replaced by a
new one over different reliabilities, in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05.
As is shown in Figure 2(a), the probability that the satellite
has a failure and is unable to be repaired during 15 years is
7.71%. From the analysis result in Figure 2(b), the number
of times the satellite will have a failure and be unable to be
repaired in 15 years is 0.08, under the precondition that the
reliability is 0.80. If the reliability is set to 0.5, the number
of vital failures will be smaller than 0.25 during 15 years.
Using the property to calculate the number of unscheduled
interruptions, the number of times will be 29.95 in 15 years.
B. Maintainability Properties and Analysis
Maintainability properties that we can analyse using
PRISM include:
1) the number of times that satellites need to be repaired on
the orbit in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; R = 0.80;
2) the satellite maintenance times when the reliability from the
0.01 to 0.99 in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; R = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01;
3) the satellite maintenance times when the MTBF from the
1st year to 15th years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; R = 0.01 : 0.99 :
0.01;MTBF = 1 : 129600 : 8640;
4) the number of cases that a satellite needs to be repaired on
orbit, but not eventually succeed in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.80.
The number of times the satellite needs to be repaired
on orbit in 15 years is 0.18. The number of times the
satellite needs to be repaired on orbit over time is shown in
Figure 3(a). When the reliability of the satellite is increased
to 0.5, the number of times the satellite needs to be repaired
will decrease to 0.5. Figure 3(b) illustrates that the number
of times to repair the satellite is below 1 when the MTBF
is 2 years.
C. Availability Properties and Analysis
Availability properties that we can analyse using PRISM
includes:
1) the availability of the satellite in 15 years, when the
reliability is 0.80:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; T = 129600; R = 0.80, and
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; R = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01;
2) the unavailability of a satellite over the satellite operation
time:
(T − R=?[C <= T ])/T ; T = 0 : 129600 : 8640; R =
0.80;
3) the relationship between satellite availability and its main-
tenance time taken for scheduled interruption:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; T = 129600; R = 0.80, f = 1 :
48 : 3.
The availability of the satellite is 99.83% in 15 years when
the reliability is 0.80. As is shown in Figure 4(a), if the
reliability increases to 0.4, the availability of the satellite
reaches 0.995. So if the required probability of the available
satellite is 0.995, the reliability must have minimum value
0.4. Figure 4(b) presents the result of availability property
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Figure 3. Analysis results of maintainability properties.
3). It shows that if the required availability is 0.995, the
time taken for scheduled interruption for the satellite will
be smaller than 16 hours.
V. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of notable attempts to use
formal methods to address the problems of design explo-
ration for a satellite system. The theorem prover PVS [11]
was used to verify desired properties in system models of
Ariane 5 where cost of failure is highest. The PICGAL
project [12] has analysed ground-based software for launch
vehicles similar to Ariane 5. In the NASA report [13],
formal methods and their approaches to critical systems are
explained to stakeholders from the aerospace domain. In
[14], the potential role of formal methods in the analysis of
software failures in space missions is discussed. Similarly,
[15] explores how veriﬁcation techniques, such as static
analysis, model checking, and compositional veriﬁcation,
can be used to gain trust in model-based systems.
Model checking has been successfully applied to numer-
ous computer systems and their applications, including both
software and hardware systems [16], [17], [18], [19]. Histor-
ically, model checking has been considered to be a powerful
extension of the traditional veriﬁcation process such as
emulation and simulation. It has also proved to be a suitable
formal technique for exposing errors in satellites, mainly
due to classical concurrency errors. Unforeseen interleavings
between processes many cause undesired events to happen.
In [20], the SPIN model checker [21] was used to formally
analyse a multithreaded plan execution module. This mod-
ule is a component of NASA’s artiﬁcial intelligence-based
spacecraft control system which launched in 1998 as part
of the Deep Space 1 mission. Five previously undiscovered
errors were identiﬁed in the spacecraft controller, in one case
representing a major design ﬂaw.
The model checking tool Murψ [22] has been used in
[23] to model the Entry, Descent and Landing phase of
the Mars Polar Lander. The model checker was used to
search for sequences of states that led to the violation of
a Murψ invariant. This stated that the thrust of the pulse-
width modulation, which controls the thrust of the descent
engines, should always be above a certain altitude. In [24]
the model checker NuSMV [25] is used to model and
verify the implementation of a mission and safety critical
embedded satellite software control system. The control
system is responsible for maintaining the attitude of the
satellite and for performing fault detection, isolation, and
recovery decisions, at a detailed level.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a range of model checkers has been em-
ployed to represent and reason about design and failure
of space based systems. The traditional approaches are not
suitable for analysing system reliability and performance. In
this paper, we consider an automated veriﬁcation approach -
probabilistic model checking, which extends classical model
checking with quantitative analysis support.
Since parameter settings of our formal models are based
on GPS Block III which is newest generation of GPS
systems, our analysis results can be compared to existing
GPS statistical analysis. In [9], the availability of the GPS
Block III is given as 99.9%. The availability we evaluate
in this paper is close to the actual data. This indicates
that our approach is feasible and efﬁcient. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to use probabilistic model
checking to perform RAM analysis of satellite systems.
Actually, numerous failures are distributed differently
other than exponential distributions. In particular, a number
of failures of satellites have a Weibull distribution [10],
which follows the conventional three-component bathtub
curve which models a burn-in and wear-out phase for failure
prediction. For future work, we will look at how to represent
arbitrary distributions in probabilistic models, and to what
extent such kind of distributions are able to be supported by
probabilistic model checking approaches. Further, we plan
to extend our work of analysing a single satellite to satellite
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Figure 4. Analysis results of availability properties.
constellation consisting of multiple satellites.
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